Going forward financially: credit unions as an alternative to commercial banks by Klinedinst, Mark
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Going forward financially: credit unions




MPRA Paper No. 38191, posted 18. April 2012 15:31 UTC
Draft,	  October	  2011:	  	  
	  
Going	  Forward	  Financially:	  	  
Credit	  Unions	  as	  an	  Alternative	  to	  Commercial	  Banks	  
	  	  
Mark Klinedinst 
Emeritus Professor of Economics 
 at the University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS  
E-mail: mklinedinst@mac.com. 
Abstract The	  global	  financial	  meltdown	  brought	  to	  light	  a	  number	  of	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  U.S.	  financial	  system.	  Not	  all	  financial	  institution	  types	  will	  be	  taking	  large	  sums	  of	  taxpayer	  money	  to	  address	  their	  crippling	  decisions.	  Credit	  unions	  in	  the	  U.S.	  represent	  a	  type	  of	  financial	  cooperative	  that	  will	  probably	  not	  take	  any	  taxpayer	  money	  directly	  due	  to	  their	  structure	  and	  prudential	  oversight.	  Commercial	  banks,	  especially	  the	  megabanks,	  are	  likely	  to	  see	  even	  more	  bailouts	  in	  the	  future	  unless	  structural	  weaknesses	  are	  addressed	  in	  the	  clarifications	  as	  part	  of	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act.	  Using	  a	  unique	  panel	  data	  set	  on	  U.S.	  commercial	  banks,	  thrifts	  and	  credit	  unions	  from	  1994	  through	  2010	  (over	  300,000	  observations)	  performance	  metrics	  on	  a	  number	  of	  dimensions	  point	  to	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  various	  financial	  institutional	  forms.	  Credit	  unions	  also	  have	  had	  far	  fewer	  adjustable	  rate	  mortgages	  and	  mortgage	  backed	  securities	  as	  a	  percent	  of	  their	  portfolio.	  Robust	  estimators	  to	  correct	  for	  potential	  endogeneity	  are	  used	  to	  analyze	  the	  ROA	  differentials	  between	  different	  institutional	  forms	  and	  portfolios.	  	  When	  controlling	  for	  size,	  region	  and	  portfolios	  credit	  unions	  are	  estimated	  to	  have	  a	  better	  ROA.	  Institutions	  of	  under	  a	  billion	  dollars,	  96	  percent	  of	  the	  sample,	  show	  credit	  unions	  having	  higher	  efficiency	  in	  that	  they	  control	  30	  percent	  more	  assets	  per	  dollar	  spent	  on	  salaries	  than	  commercial	  banks.1	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I.	  Introduction	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  "Great	  Recession"	  has	  brought	  tremendous	  hardship	  to	  many	  across	  the	  globe.	  The	  finger	  pointing	  for	  who	  was	  at	  fault	  has	  not	  often	  strayed	  far	  from	  the	  financial	  sector	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  focus	  has	  often	  been	  on	  bank	  lending	  and	  regulatory	  oversight.	  What	  has	  often	  been	  missed	  in	  this	  focus	  has	  been	  the	  relative	  strength	  of	  the	  U.S.'s	  cooperative	  financial	  sector,	  the	  credit	  unions.	  Credit	  unions	  in	  the	  U.S.	  will	  ultimately	  probably	  not	  take	  a	  penny	  from	  the	  U.S.	  taxpayer	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  bailout	  for	  this	  crisis,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  amount	  given	  to	  commercial	  banks	  either	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  by	  a	  number	  of	  observers	  is	  well	  into	  trillions	  of	  dollars	  (e.g.,	  Blinder	  and	  Zandi	  2010	  and	  the	  Congressional Oversight Panel 2010 and 
2011).	  	  	  This	  paper	  will	  look	  at	  the	  U.S.	  financial	  sector	  and	  try	  to	  detect	  what	  early	  signals	  can	  be	  discerned	  that	  may	  help	  prevent	  a	  repeat	  of	  the	  current	  tragic	  contraction	  of	  world	  GDP	  and	  help	  develop	  prudential	  lending	  and	  regulatory	  practices	  by	  comparing	  the	  path	  various	  financial	  intermediaries	  have	  followed.	  	  Using	  a	  data	  set	  on	  all	  commercial	  banks,	  savings	  banks	  and	  credit	  unions	  in	  the	  United	  States	  for	  the	  last	  17	  years	  allows	  for	  comparisons	  between	  types	  of	  intermediaries	  that	  permits	  for	  controls	  for	  a	  number	  of	  different	  settings.	  This	  data	  set	  is	  quite	  unusual	  in	  its	  breadth	  and	  depth	  and	  makes	  possible	  an	  assessment	  of	  conditions	  precipitating	  the	  financial	  collapse	  across	  financial	  forms.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  regulatory	  environment	  is	  likely	  to	  change	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  legislation	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  globally	  as	  well	  due	  to	  stiffer	  capital	  requirements	  in	  the	  Basel	  Accords	  (Stefan	  Walter,	  2010).	  Although	  there	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  changes	  in	  the	  regulatory	  environment	  for	  all	  financial	  institutions,	  a	  number	  of	  the	  changes	  come	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about	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  appropriate	  oversight	  of	  proper	  lending	  safeguards,	  capital	  adequacy	  and	  firm	  governance.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  fallout	  from	  this	  financial	  crisis	  continues	  to	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  high	  number	  of	  institutional	  failures.	  From	  the	  start	  of	  2008	  until	  the	  end	  of	  2010	  there	  were	  366	  bank	  failures	  in	  the	  U.S.	  compared	  to	  27	  from	  the	  start	  of	  2000	  to	  the	  end	  of	  2007.2	  Credit	  unions,	  although	  percentage	  wise	  their	  failures	  have	  been	  smaller	  they	  likewise	  have	  had	  trouble	  during	  the	  recession	  with	  52	  closures	  over	  the	  same	  three	  year	  period.	  This	  lack	  of	  failure	  during	  tough	  economic	  times	  and	  much	  smaller	  bailouts	  from	  the	  taxpayer	  make	  it	  no	  surprise	  that	  credit	  unions	  are	  the	  most	  common	  financial	  intermediary	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  have	  been	  for	  some	  time.	  The	  institutional	  structure	  and	  practices	  differ	  quite	  a	  bit	  between	  credit	  unions,	  commercial	  banks	  and	  savings	  banks.	  Credit	  unions	  are	  financial	  cooperatives,	  one	  person-­‐one	  vote	  rules	  prevail	  in	  determining	  management	  and	  are	  regulated	  by	  the	  National	  Credit	  Union	  Administration.	  Commercial	  banks	  and	  savings	  banks3	  may	  be	  publicly	  traded	  joint	  stock	  companies	  and	  usually,	  especially	  commercial	  banks,	  have	  more	  diverse	  portfolios	  than	  credit	  unions	  and	  are	  regulated	  by	  the	  Federal	  Deposit	  Insurance	  Corporation	  or	  the	  Office	  of	  Thrift	  Supervision.	  To	  the	  average	  consumer	  sometimes	  the	  difference	  between	  these	  institutions	  is	  not	  apparent,	  but	  clearly	  the	  financial	  performance	  during	  this	  crisis	  and	  earlier	  crises	  often	  offer	  stark	  comparisons.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  There	  were	  45	  failures	  in	  2011	  as	  of	  June	  4th,	  2011	  for	  both	  commercial	  and	  savings	  banks	  combined	  (source	  FDIC).	  	  Eight	  credit	  unions	  have	  closed	  over	  this	  same	  period.	  	  3	  Savings	  banks	  and	  savings	  associations	  are	  grouped	  together	  here.	  	  
   4
	  	  	  	  	  The	  next	  section	  will	  discuss	  the	  theory	  on	  different	  financial	  institutions	  and	  performance.	  The	  third	  section	  will	  examine	  the	  data	  used	  here	  and	  the	  empirical	  approach.	  The	  final	  two	  parts	  of	  the	  paper	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  empirical	  results	  and	  the	  policy	  implications	  that	  follow.	  	  	  
II.	  Theory	  	  	  	  	  	  Credit	  unions	  and	  banks	  have	  a	  long	  history	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Although	  they	  generally	  fill	  a	  different	  niche	  in	  the	  market,	  they	  compete	  in	  some	  cases	  quite	  fiercely.	  Credit	  unions	  as	  financial	  cooperatives,	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  one	  person-­‐one	  vote,	  are	  non-­‐profit	  institutions.	  Hence	  when	  comparing	  banks	  and	  credit	  unions	  a	  major	  question	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  is	  what	  is	  the	  appropriate	  metric	  across	  such	  dissimilar	  institutions.	  Reporting	  to	  stockholders	  who	  want	  a	  good	  return	  on	  investments,	  managers	  would	  be	  keen	  to	  follow	  the	  return	  on	  assets	  (ROA).	  Credit	  unions,	  however,	  may	  be	  modeled	  as	  maximizing	  their	  shareholders	  income,	  quite	  a	  different	  maximand	  since	  for	  example	  the	  return	  retained	  by	  the	  credit	  union	  may	  make	  the	  income	  from	  deposits	  smaller	  for	  the	  shareholder	  (Bauer,	  2010	  and	  
Sollenberger, 2008).	  Efficiency	  measures	  may	  sometimes	  work	  across	  institutions,	  but	  still	  typically	  suffer	  from	  the	  same	  confounding	  problems	  as	  the	  return	  on	  assets	  criterion.	  The	  ability	  to	  survive	  adverse	  conditions,	  contributions	  to	  the	  community	  (or	  minus	  in	  the	  case	  of	  bailouts),	  assets	  per	  employee	  or	  assets	  per	  dollar	  spent	  on	  salaries	  are	  all	  commonly	  used	  metrics.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Credit	  unions	  are	  typically	  much	  smaller	  than	  banks,	  hence	  their	  role	  as	  a	  small	  town	  lender	  is	  often	  similar	  to	  small	  banks.	  Like	  small	  banks	  in	  rural	  areas	  they	  play	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a	  key	  role	  in	  economic	  development	  by	  allowing	  small	  businesses	  the	  cash	  needed	  to	  get	  started	  or	  to	  continue	  to	  operate.	  This	  help	  to	  businesses	  is	  often	  indirect	  in	  the	  form	  of	  loans	  to	  an	  individual	  for	  home	  equity	  or	  personal	  loans	  (credit	  unions	  are	  proscribed	  by	  law	  to	  limit	  their	  business	  lending	  to	  12.25	  percent	  of	  assets4).	  In	  the	  U.S.	  then	  the	  credit	  union	  often	  plays	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Grameen	  bank	  by	  helping	  out	  small	  businesses.	  Certainly	  a	  useful	  metric	  then	  would	  be	  how	  many	  sucessful	  businesses	  started	  out	  with	  a	  loan	  from	  a	  credit	  union,	  savings	  bank	  or	  commercial	  bank,	  but	  alas	  this	  data	  is	  not	  readily	  available.	  Another	  metric	  that	  could	  be	  explored	  is	  the	  development	  of	  social	  capital	  (Aoki,	  2010	  and	  Klinedinst,	  2007).	  How	  much	  trust	  does	  a	  customer	  feel	  towards	  their	  intermediary	  may	  be	  a	  useful	  metric	  if	  this	  could	  be	  measured.	  Does	  this	  trusting	  relationship	  depend	  on	  customer	  relations'	  strategies	  that	  may	  for	  example,	  at	  least	  temporarily,	  cause	  more	  employees	  to	  be	  added	  and	  then	  hurt	  the	  "bottom	  line?"	  	  	  
III.	  Data	  and	  Methodology	  
    The data set covers all credit unions and banks in the United States from 1994 until 
December 2010, available from the FDIC and the National Credit Union Association 
(NCUA). Altogether there are 331,289 observations over the seventeen-year period.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Credit unions are actively trying to increase this limit to 27.5 percent of assets arguing 
that this would create thousands of jobs and help diversify portfolios. 
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 Determining credit union and bank performance could be done, as mentioned already, by 
looking at returns on assets, net charge-offs, asset growth, number of failures, variants of 
the value-added approach or assets per employee.5  
Generally the functional forms estimated can be posited as: 
Yit = αi + ß X it  + ε it            (1) 
 
The performance indicator, Yit, used here is return on assets.  The intercept, αi, captures 
firm specific factors which may be otherwise unseen, while the X matrix contains policy 
variables, state dummies, regional and time dummies to capture exogenous 
contemporaneous shocks. The use of firm specific intercepts helps to eliminate the bias 
that may be due, for example, to larger firms having the ability to use better technology 
or stronger market power. The time invariance of a credit union dummy variable that is 
used would in a fixed effects model mean these estimates would be unavailable. Using a 
random effects estimator allows us to keep this time invariant variable. The robust Huber-
White sandwich estimator allowed estimates of the standard errors in the presence of 
potential heterogeneity over such a diverse range of institutions.6 Possible endogeneity 
problems may arise, hence to correct for possible non-spherical errors terms the 
instrumental variable technique developed by Hausman and Taylor (1981) is used. This 
technique partitions the right hand side variables such that equation one can be rewritten 
as: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See for example, Sollenberger (2008), Greer and Rhoades (1977), Lieberman and Asaba 
(1997), Berger and Humphrey (1992), Goddard J., McKillop D. and Wilson J. (2008), 
and Park and Weber (2006).  
 
6 White (1980). 
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Yit = αi + ß X it  + γ Z it + ε it            (2) 
 
Here X it  is assumed to be exogenous and Z it contains elements that may be endogenous. 
Using a generalized instrumental variable estimator on this equation gives statistics that 
are asymptotically valid. This method allows estimation of the primary variable examined 
here, the time invariant dummies for whether the institution is a credit union, savings 
bank or a commercial bank.7  	  
IV.	  Results	  
	  	  	  	  	  Credit	  unions	  are	  the	  most	  numerous	  financial	  intermediary	  in	  the	  U.S.	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Table	  1	  where	  they	  make	  up	  just	  over	  50	  percent	  of	  the	  observations.	  Next	  in	  number	  are	  commercial	  banks	  with	  about	  42	  percent	  of	  the	  observations,	  with	  savings	  banks	  making	  up	  the	  remainder.	  The	  rate	  of	  return	  on	  assets	  is	  highest	  at	  commercial	  banks	  and	  lower	  at	  credit	  unions	  as	  theory	  would	  suggest	  and	  even	  lower	  at	  savings	  banks	  that	  have	  been	  hard	  hit	  by	  the	  decline	  in	  the	  housing	  industry.	  Total	  assets	  for	  intermediaries	  average	  $569	  million	  in	  2010	  dollars.	  Commercial	  and	  savings	  banks	  average	  about	  15	  times	  the	  assets	  of	  credit	  unions	  at	  67.2	  million.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  there	  are	  commercial	  banks	  that	  individually	  have	  more	  assets	  than	  all	  the	  credit	  unions	  combined	  (e.g.,	  J.	  P.	  Morgan	  with	  $1.78	  trillion	  versus	  the	  combined	  assets	  of	  credit	  unions	  in	  2010	  of	  $934	  billion).	  The	  data	  on	  the	  number	  of	  employees	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  real	  assets	  with	  the	  banks	  being	  eight	  to	  ten	  times	  as	  large	  as	  the	  average	  credit	  union.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Woolridge 2006, p. 327, Baltagi and Khanti-Akom (1990) and Baltagi (2005). 
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  Assets	  per	  employee	  average	  about	  $4.7	  million	  dollars	  overall	  with	  commercial	  having	  the	  highest	  ratio	  at	  $7	  million	  dollars.	  Given	  that	  there	  may	  be	  large	  differences	  in	  the	  salaries	  the	  assets	  per	  dollar	  spent	  on	  salaries	  is	  also	  calculated.	  Here	  the	  ratios	  are	  much	  closer	  with	  an	  overall	  average	  of	  about	  $97	  and	  commercial	  banks	  again	  being	  the	  higher	  than	  credit	  unions	  and	  savings	  banks	  by	  approximately	  8	  percent.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  salaries	  sometimes	  make	  up	  a	  small	  percent	  of	  executive	  compensation	  at	  larger	  institutions	  since	  incentive	  payments	  in	  the	  form	  of	  bonuses,	  options,	  deferred	  compensation,	  etc.	  may	  approach	  100	  percent.	  Hence	  consideration	  of	  just	  salaries	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  assets	  to	  salary	  figures	  stated	  here	  would	  be	  substantially	  overstated	  for	  large	  institutions.	  To	  get	  around	  this	  problem	  and	  to	  make	  a	  comparison	  among	  similar	  sized	  institutions,	  the	  figures	  for	  "assets	  per	  dollar	  of	  salary"	  were	  also	  computed	  for	  all	  institutions	  with	  assets	  less	  than	  one	  billion	  dollars.	  This	  left	  approximately	  96	  percent	  of	  the	  sample	  and	  reversed	  the	  findings	  from	  the	  whole	  sample.	  Credit	  unions	  control	  about	  30	  percent	  more	  assets	  per	  dollar	  spent	  on	  salaries	  than	  commercial	  banks	  and	  about	  12	  percent	  more	  than	  savings	  institutions8.	  	  This	  appears	  to	  capture	  part	  of	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  approximately	  100,000	  volunteers	  contribute	  to	  the	  bottom	  line	  for	  credit	  unions	  and	  helps	  give	  them	  the	  financial	  power	  to	  give	  better	  rates.	  	  These	  results	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  credit	  unions	  may	  be	  just	  "the	  tip	  of	  the	  iceberg"	  if	  all	  incentive	  compensation	  was	  available.	  Loans	  to	  insiders,	  a	  potential	  loss	  to	  shareholders	  and	  members,	  averages	  about	  $2.4	  million	  dollars,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Note	  the	  results	  reported	  in	  Table	  1	  for	  this	  variable	  dropped	  all	  values	  less	  than	  zero,	  even	  without	  this	  change	  the	  values	  were	  almost	  identical,	  e.g.,	  	  309,256	  observations	  retained	  from	  322,239.	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again	  commercial	  banks	  are	  the	  highest	  at	  $5.1	  million	  or	  16.5	  times	  greater	  than	  the	  credit	  unions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  next	  series	  of	  variables	  relate	  to	  the	  asset	  portfolio.	  First	  mortgages	  average	  11	  percent	  overall	  with	  savings	  banks	  having	  the	  highest	  percent.	  Adjustable	  rate	  mortgages,	  which	  often	  were	  a	  problem	  in	  the	  housing	  collapse	  (Hampel	  et	  al,	  2008)	  average	  3.5	  percent	  with	  credit	  unions	  having	  just	  0.8	  percent.	  Commercial	  and	  industrial	  loans	  average	  4.5	  percent	  with	  credit	  unions	  having	  just	  0.3	  percent	  and	  as	  expected	  commercial	  having	  twice	  the	  average.	  Credit	  card	  loans	  have	  a	  1.4	  percent	  average	  overall	  with	  credit	  unions	  having	  the	  highest	  percent	  at	  about	  2.2	  percent.	  Mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	  average	  3.5	  percent	  of	  assets	  with	  credit	  unions	  having	  just	  0.4	  percent	  of	  the	  average.	  The	  last	  variable	  included	  in	  Table	  1	  is	  net	  charge-­‐offs,	  uncollectable	  obligations	  minus	  that	  recovered.	  The	  average	  is	  about	  32	  basis	  points	  with	  credit	  unions	  having	  the	  highest	  average	  of	  40	  basis	  points.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  regression	  results	  presented	  in	  Table	  2	  from	  left	  to	  right	  increase	  in	  complexity	  in	  this	  unbalanced	  panel	  data	  set	  with	  27,968	  firms.	  Random	  effects	  models	  are	  in	  columns	  one	  and	  two,	  with	  column	  two	  including	  regional	  and	  state	  dummies	  as	  well,	  try	  to	  capture	  unobservable	  differences	  due	  to	  managerial	  ability,	  technology,	  etc.	  	  The	  Hausman-­‐Taylor	  model	  used	  columns	  three	  and	  four	  take	  into	  account	  the	  potential	  presence	  of	  endogeneity,	  which	  the	  Durbin-­‐Wu-­‐Hausman	  test	  showed	  to	  be	  present.9	  The	  additional	  controls	  in	  column	  4	  proved	  to	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  χ2 of 7,200 with eleven degrees of freedom and a p value of 0.00.	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significant10,	  hence	  column	  four	  will	  be	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  discussion	  on	  the	  econometric	  results.	  A	  dummy	  for	  institutions	  with	  assets	  over	  $50	  billion,	  "too	  big	  to	  fail,"	  is	  included	  to	  try	  and	  capture	  any	  effects	  that	  come	  from	  such	  a	  large	  size	  and	  that	  may	  cause	  systemic	  risk.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  coefficient	  for	  the	  credit	  union	  dummy,	  relative	  to	  savings	  banks,	  is	  consistently	  positive	  and	  significant	  across	  all	  the	  specifications	  in	  Table	  2.	  The	  dummy	  representing	  commercial	  banks	  is	  positive	  and	  significant	  in	  all	  but	  the	  last	  column.	  The	  dummy	  for	  institutions	  that	  have	  assets	  of	  over	  $50	  billion	  is	  negative	  in	  all	  equations,	  but	  insignificant.	  Coefficients	  for	  assets	  and	  employees,	  an	  attempt	  to	  control	  for	  scale	  effects,	  are	  typically	  insignificant.	  Assets	  per	  employee	  and	  assets	  per	  dollar	  of	  salary	  also	  were	  not	  measured	  with	  much	  precision.	  Loans	  to	  insiders,	  a	  way	  to	  possibly	  measure	  hidden	  compensation,	  had	  a	  positive	  correlation	  with	  ROA,	  but	  again	  not	  significant	  in	  the	  endogenous	  equations	  in	  columns	  3	  and	  4.	  Portfolio	  variables	  on	  mortgages,	  credit	  card	  loans,	  commercial	  loans	  and	  mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	  were	  all	  measured	  to	  be	  significant.	  Only	  credit	  card	  loans	  were	  estimated	  to	  have	  a	  negative	  impact.	  The	  coefficient	  on	  net	  charge-­‐offs,	  as	  expected,	  is	  negative	  and	  significant	  in	  column	  four.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 χ2 of 4,194 with twenty-nine degrees of freedom and a p value of 0.00. 
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V.	  Policy	  Implications	  	  	  	  	  Credit	  unions	  although	  the	  most	  numerous	  financial	  intermediary	  in	  the	  United	  States	  have	  an	  important	  role	  to	  play	  in	  that	  their	  failure	  rates	  are	  much	  less	  than	  other	  financial	  institutions.	  The	  small	  size	  of	  the	  institution	  may	  be	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  developing	  strong	  ties	  to	  customers	  that	  lead	  not	  only	  to	  trust	  and	  loyalty,	  but	  also	  to	  engendering	  pertinent	  information	  to	  offer	  loans	  and	  other	  services	  that	  are	  prudentially	  sound.	  Finding	  a	  good	  metric	  to	  measure	  performance	  across	  institution	  types	  is	  a	  difficult	  problem	  that	  offers	  no	  easy	  solution.	  	  For	  example,	  	  return	  on	  assets	  (ROA)	  is	  commonly	  used	  in	  many	  industries,	  but	  for	  associations	  and	  financial	  cooperatives	  this	  is	  not	  commonly	  seen	  to	  be	  the	  organizations	  primary	  objective.	  Efficiency	  measures	  are	  also	  problematic	  in	  many	  cases	  for	  spanning	  institutional	  forms	  since	  what	  may	  be	  efficient	  in	  one	  setting	  may	  be	  counter	  productive	  in	  another.	  Acknowledging	  the	  caveats	  about	  using	  the	  ROA	  nevertheless	  that	  is	  the	  main	  metric	  used	  here	  to	  compare	  the	  performance	  of	  credit	  unions,	  savings	  banks	  and	  commercial	  banks.	  As	  would	  be	  expected	  the	  average	  ROA	  at	  commercial	  banks	  is	  higher	  than	  found	  at	  credit	  unions	  and	  savings	  banks.	  The	  assets	  per	  dollar	  spent	  on	  reported	  salaries	  are	  similar	  for	  credit	  unions	  and	  savings	  banks,	  with	  commercial	  banks	  being	  a	  bit	  higher.	  This	  ranking	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  reversed	  when	  other	  forms	  of	  compensation	  are	  included	  (e.g.,	  executive	  office	  space,	  jets,	  insider	  loans,	  etc.).	  This	  ranking	  is	  reversed	  also	  when	  large	  institutions	  with	  over	  a	  billion	  dollars	  of	  assets	  are	  excluded.	  When	  considering	  these	  smaller	  institutions,	  which	  include	  about	  96	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  observations,	  the	  credit	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unions	  average	  30	  percent	  more	  assets	  per	  dollar	  of	  salary	  than	  commercial	  banks.	  These	  figures	  which	  do	  not	  even	  include	  various	  expenditures	  on	  other	  forms	  of	  compensation	  show	  a	  considerable	  advantage	  that	  credit	  unions	  have	  in	  efficiency.	  	  This	  	  adjustable	  rate	  mortgages	  which	  were	  notorious	  in	  a	  number	  of	  instances	  of	  predatory	  lending	  were	  found	  to	  be	  a	  much	  smaller	  percent	  of	  assets	  at	  credit	  unions	  than	  either	  commercial	  or	  savings	  banks.	  Another	  area	  that	  probably	  has	  helped	  the	  credit	  unions	  fare	  better	  in	  this	  collapse	  is	  the	  much	  smaller	  percent	  of	  mortgage-­‐backed	  securities,	  just	  0.4	  percent	  of	  the	  overall	  average.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  estimated	  equations	  show	  that	  when	  controls	  for	  size,	  region	  and	  portfolio	  distribution	  are	  taken	  into	  consideration	  that	  credit	  unions	  have	  a	  better	  ROA	  than	  commercial	  and	  savings	  banks,	  even	  though	  this	  is	  often	  not	  taken	  to	  be	  the	  primary	  goal	  of	  the	  credit	  unions.	  No	  discernable	  impact	  in	  the	  "too	  big	  to	  fail"	  category,	  here	  over	  $50	  billion	  in	  assets,	  was	  seen	  on	  ROA.	  A	  number	  of	  factors	  could	  be	  responsible	  for	  this	  strong	  performance	  with	  ROA	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  large	  taxpayer	  bailout.	  This	  result	  could	  be	  from	  the	  network	  of	  trust	  that	  is	  often	  developed	  at	  credit	  unions	  in	  their	  goal	  to	  service	  their	  members,	  fewer	  cases	  of	  excessive	  executive	  compensation,	  the	  prudential	  avoidance	  of	  untenable	  adjustable	  loans,	  avoidance	  of	  mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	  whose	  pricing	  was	  questionable	  and	  better	  regulatory	  oversight	  are	  all	  probably	  contributing	  influences.	  The	  small	  size	  of	  these	  financial	  cooperatives	  could	  give	  them	  an	  information	  advantage	  that	  allows	  for	  better	  decision	  making	  about	  a	  host	  of	  concerns,	  such	  as	  loan	  selection,	  choice	  of	  executives	  and	  their	  compensation,	  community	  awareness	  and	  developing	  connections	  to	  other	  credit	  unions.	  Although	  the	  results	  indicate	  a	  number	  of	  areas	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Variable11 Mean St. Dev. Min Max Number 
Return on 
Assets***  
0.0075316 0.018461 -0.9269855 0.9197733 331,289 
 Credit Unions 0.0063958 0.016454 -0.9269855 0.7486125 166,647 
Savings Banks 0.0058507 0.025132 -0.7087379 0.8340615 25,884 
Commercial 
Banks 
0.0092245 0.019140	   -0.8148771 0.9197733 138,527 
Total assets*** 
(2010 dollars) 
569 m. $ 13 b. $ 0 1.78 t. $ 331,289 
 Credit Union 67.2 m. $ 386 m. $ 0 44.2 b. $ 166,647 
 Savings Banks 1.03 b. $ 7.1 b. $ 123,293 $ 370 b. $ 25,884 
 Commercial   
  Banks 
1.08 b. $ 19.6 b. $ 67240 $ 1.78 t. $ 138,527 
Employees*** 112 1944 0 231,333 331,289 
 Credit Union 20 80 0 7,303 166,647 
 Savings Banks 161 901	   0 50,817 25,884 
 Commercial   
  Banks 




4,745,623 $ 149 m. $ 0 $ 37.2 b. $ 331,289 
 Credit Union 2,562,328 $ 2.1 m.  $ 0 $ 254 m.  $ 166,647 
 Savings Banks 5,663,224 $ 13.6 m.  $ 61,647 $  940 m.  $ 25,884 
 Commercial   
  Banks 
7,092,385 $ 228 m.  $ 19,553 $ 37.2 b. $ 138,527 
Assets per Dollar 
of Salary 
(2010 dollars) 
96.78 $ 5,790.31 $ -45,536.13 $     2,847,655 $ 322,239 
 Credit Union 93.39 $ 4,084.57 $ -45,536.13 $ 1,515,178 $ 158,164 
 Savings Banks 93.78 $ 343.93 $ 0.14 $  41,119 $ 25,871 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 ***, **, and * indicating significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively for 
difference in means.  
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 Commercial   
  Banks 
101.22 $ 7,684.97 $ -2,798.10 $     2,847,655 $ 138,204 
Assets per Dollar 
of Salary for 
firms with Assets 
under 1 billion 
(2010 dollars) 
83.73 $ 2923.08$ 0.14$     1,515,178$ 309,256 
 Credit Union 93.78$ 4103.40$ 0.66$ 1,515,178 $ 156,587 
 Savings Banks 83.19$ 168.01$ 0.14$  22,563$ 22,849 
 Commercial   
  Banks 
71.69$ 199.11$ 0.25$ 35,224$ 129,820 
Assets per Dollar 
of Salary for 
firms with under 
a billion in assets 
(2010 dollars) 
83.52 $ 2,924.24 $ -45,536.13 $ 1,515,178 $ 309,263 
 Credit Union 93.39 $ 4,1045.00$ -45,536.13 $ 1,515,178 $ 156,593 
 Savings Banks 83.78 $ 168.01 $ 0.14 $  22,562 $ 22,840 
 Commercial   
  Banks 




2,426,091 $ 27.5 m. $ 0 $     5.10 b. $ 331289 
 Credit Union 310,062 $ 1.5 m. $ 0 $ 0.30 b. $ 166647 
 Savings Banks 1,690,478 $ 16.9 m. $ 0 $  2.07 b. $ 25884 
 Commercial   
  Banks 





0.1110537 0.1305835 0 0.991595 331,286 
 Credit Union 0.0722717 0.1128349 0 0.9145243 166,644 
 Savings Banks 0.2143539 0.2374389 0 0.991595 25,884 
 Commercial   
  Banks 




percent of assets 
0.0353121 0.0805795 0 0.9111944 331,286 
 Credit Union 0.0084741 0.0395383 0 0.7730708 166,644 
 Savings Banks 0.1567215 0.1641324 0 0.9111944 25,884 
 Commercial   0.0449707 0.0699852 0 0.8563153 138,527 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Note the figure for savings banks and commercial banks includes residences with up to 
four families. 
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percent of assets 
0.0452425 0.0710911 0 1.0 331,286 
 Credit Union 0.0034338 0.0276117 0 1.0 166,644 
 Savings Banks 0.0250799 0.0400408 0 0.6306143 25,884 
 Commercial   
  Banks 
0.0988948 0.0750369 0 0.9616175 138,527 
Credit card 
loans*** 
percent of assets 
0.0139755 0.0458483 0 1.0 331,286 
 Credit Union 0.0218609 0.0348321 0 0.9757313 166,644 
 Savings Banks 0.0033647 0.0355006 0 1.0 25,884 
 Commercial   
  Banks 




percent of assets 
0.0349667 0.0782623 0 0.9672325 331,286 
 Credit Union 0.0001421 0.0037818 0 0.3116819 166,644 
 Savings Banks 0.1113306 0.1373305 0 0.9649894 25,884 
 Commercial   
  Banks 





percent of assets 
0.0031981 0.0169807 -1.076378 5.778124 331,286 
 Credit Union 0.0040389 0.0103099 -0.4261894 0. 6933583 166,644 
 Savings Banks 0.0014081 0.0136756 -1.076378 1.683438 25,884 
 Commercial   
  Banks 











Return on Assets, U.S. Data 1994-2010 
(Dependent variable is return on assets. Standard errors are in parentheses13) 
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(0.0685504) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 ***, **, and * indicating significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.  
14 Firms with over $50 billion in assets. There were 494 observations in this group, 56 for 
savings banks and the rest were commercial banks.  
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Time Dummies  yes yes yes yes 
Region Dummies  yes  yes 
State Dummies	    yes  yes 
N	   331,283  331,283 331,283 331,283 
Number of 
Groups	   27,968 27,968 27,968 27,968 
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